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This paper presents a uniﬁed framework to study the co-evolution
of networks and play, using the language of evolutionary game the-
ory. We show by examples that the set-up is rich enough to en-
compass many recent models discussed by the literature. We com-
pletely characterize the invariant distribution of such processes and
show how to calculate stochastically stable states by means of a tree-
characterization algorithm. Moreover, specializing the process a bit
further allows us to completely characterize the generated random
graph ensemble. This new result demonstrates a new and rather
general relation between random graph theory and evolutionary
models with endogenous interaction structures.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Network co-evolution, Ran-
dom graphs
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1 Introduction
Recently there has been an attempt to apply stochastic evolutionary game
dynamics to models on the co-evolution of networks and play. Broadly
speaking, one may divide these models in two classes. There is one
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1branch of literature which extends the mistakes model of Kandori et al.
(1993) and Young (1993) to a random process of action adjustment and
link creation/destruction. Jackson and Watts (2002), Goyal and Vega-
Redondo (2005), Hojman and Szeidl (2006) are models in this direction,
and we call them, due to their ancestry, “classical” models. Another type
of models assume that the network is under a recurrent attack of un-
guided drift, which is interpreted as environmental volatility. Marsili
et al. (2004), Ehrhardt et al. (2006; 2008a) are models in this direction,
which we will call “volatility” models. The aim of this paper is to present
an uniﬁed framework, that is rich enough to incorporate classical, as well
as volatility models. We do so by presenting a rather general class of
co-evolutionary models, called Mβ. In essence Mβ is a family of per-
turbed Markov chains taking values on some ﬁnite state space Ω, which
consists of all pairs of action proﬁles (α) and networks (g). We give an
“axiomatic“ deﬁnition of processes Mβ which models the co-evolution
of networks and play in an integrated way. At a heuristic level, the algo-
rithm works as follows:
Suppose the system starts from some point ω = (α, g). Departing from
this state, the system may evolve via three possible routes. With some
probability a randomly chosen individual gets the opportunity to change
his action. This causes a change in the action proﬁle α. With complemen-
tary probability the network changes, resulting in the creation of a new
edge, or the destruction of an existing edge. The characterizing feature
of the process is that the behavioral rules, describing how agents change
their action, or how they create or delete links depend, in general, on the
beneﬁts of the bilateral interaction, which, in turn, is modeled by a game
in normal form. This produces an interesting coupling between the evo-
lution of the action proﬁle α and the evolution of the network g. After
one of these events, the process arrives at a new state, and the algorithm
repeats these steps inﬁnitely often.
2The objective of this paper is to investigate the asymptotic properties of
this stochastic algorithm. We assume that the rules deﬁning the tran-
sition probabilities of Mβ are governed by a noise parameter β ∈ R+,
as is by now standard in stochastic evolutionary models.1 For β > 0
the process will be ergodic, and the long-run predictions are given by
its unique invariant distribution µβ ∈ ∆(Ω). In principle, the invariant
distribution contains all information one needs to deduce more speciﬁc
information about the long-run behavior of the system, such as the mar-
ginal probability distribution over action conﬁgurations (the object stud-
ied in “classical” evolutionary game theory with ﬁxed interaction struc-
ture) and the conditional probability distribution over networks.2 Partic-
ularly interesting is the behavior of the invariant distribution as noise
vanishes. This leads to the study of stochastically stable states, which is
one of the most prominent selection criteria of evolutionary game theory.
The traditional way to perform stochastic stability analysis is by view-
ing the Markov process as a weighted and directed graph and looking
for paths with least resistance. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993)
pioneered this approach, by adapting tools developed by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1998). The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the presentation of
a tree-characterization algorithm to compute stochastically stable states
in general co-evolutionary models. Thereby we obtain a selection cri-
terion of recurrent classes of states consisting of proﬁles of actions and
architectures of interaction, extending traditional models of evolution-
ary game theory where only the action proﬁles are considered as state
variable. The “classical” models of Jackson and Watts (2002) and Goyal
1The term “noise” has been used by Blume (2003) to emphasize the random utility
context of probabilistic behavioral rules. Other used terms have been “mistakes” or
“mutations”.
2Due to the coupling of the behavior dimension with the network dimension it would
make no sense to study a marginal distribution over networks. Only a conditional
distribution, i.e. the probability distribution over networks for a ﬁxed action proﬁle,
makes sense in these models.
3and Vega-Redondo (2005) are also concerned with this task. Our general
model provides a systematic tool kit to ﬁnd stochastically stable states
in a transparent way. We show by means of two examples, a “volatil-
ity” model and a “classical” model based on Jackson and Watts (2002),
that such a stochastic stability analysis is still tractable in co-evolutionary
models.
The second, and truly original, contribution of this paper is the charac-
terization of the generated random graph ensemble, conditional on a ﬁxed
proﬁle of actions. For this characterization we impose 3 additional “ax-
ioms”. We show that any stochastic process, satisfying the stated as-
sumptions, will converge in the long run to the probability ensemble of
so-called inhomogeneous random graphs (Söderberg, 2002, Bollobás et al.,
2007). Inhomogeneous random graphs are a straightforward extension
of the classical Erdös-Rényi model (Erdös and Rényi, 1960), by allowing
edge success probabilities to be vertex speciﬁc. These models are very
popular in the literature on random graphs, and to the best of our knowl-
edge, this interesting connection between evolutionary game dynamics
and random graph theory is novel. A co-evolutionary model with noise
provides therefore a new and independent derivation of inhomogeneous
random graphs.
The class of Markov chains we study is known in the literature on sto-
chastic optimization as a “generalized Metropolis algorithm”, and is rig-
orously surveyed by Catoni (1999; 2001). Beggs (2005) was among the ﬁrst
to recognize the close relationship between this class of random processes,
and the stochastic dynamics used in evolutionary game theory. We also
exploit this analogy and show that it provides a ﬂexible language to study
many models on the co-evolution of networks and play. To underline this,
we devote a whole section to show that the models of Staudigl (2009b;a)
ﬁt perfectly into our framework. A minor modiﬁcation of the process also
allows us to study the model of Jackson and Watts (2002).
4Related to our work is also the recent paper by Alós-Ferrer and Netzer
(2007). However, these authors ﬁx the behavioral rules of the agents at the
outset, by assuming that strategy revisions are governed by a log-linear
process, introduced by Blume (1993) into game theory. Moreover, their
paper assumes an exogenously ﬁxed interaction structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our the-
oretical framework. In Section 2.2 we derive a general form of the invari-
ant distribution, and an algorithm to detect stochastically stable states.
Section 3 presents a “classical model” and a “volatility” model. The char-
acterization of the generated random graph ensemble is presented in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendix B collect some well-known facts
on stochastic stability analysis in a self-contained way.
2 A class of Markov processes
We consider a ﬁnite population of individuals I = {1,2,..., N}. Mem-
bers of this set are also called agents or players. The set of all unordered
pairs of individuals will be denoted by I(2). The set of ordered pairs of a
ﬁnite set Ω is denoted as Ω×Ω = Ω2. In this paper we identify networks
with simple and undirected graphs on the vertex set I. Let us call G[I]
the set of all such graphs, members of which are pairs G = (I,E), where
E = E(G) ⊆ I(2) is the set of edges (links). Another convenient represen-
tation of a network is via a tuple g = (gij)1≤i<j≤N ∈ {0,1}I(2)
≡ G[I]. If
gij = 1 we say that individual i is connected to individual j, or j is a neigh-
bor of i (and vice versa). Another terminology for connectedness will be
that the edge (i, j) is active. If gij = 0 then i and j are not connected,
or edge (i, j) is neutral. The neighbors of player i are contained in the
set N i(g) := {j ∈ I|gij = 1}. Call ¯ N i(g) := N i(g) ∪ {i}. The number of
neighbors of player i deﬁnes his degree κi(g) := |N i(g)|. Given a network
g and a subset of players V ⊆ I denote the restriction of g on V as g[V],
which is an element of G[V]. The complete network on the subset V is
5denoted by gc[V]. Hence, for every g ∈ G[I] and a partition of I into sets
V1,V2, we can write g = g[V1] ⊕ g[V2], where ⊕ is interpreted as the con-
catenation of two lists of binary valued functions (after possibly relabeling
the players). In this notation g0 = g⊕gc[{(i, j)}] ≡ g⊕(i, j) is the network
obtained by adding the edge (i, j) to g. Analogously, g0 = g 	 (i, j) is the
network obtained from g by deleting edge (i, j). Denote by e = ∑i,j>i gij
the number of edges in the network.
Each individual possesses a utility function ui, describing her preferences
over some ﬁnite set of common actions A = {a1,...,aq}.3 This deﬁnes a
base game Γ = (I,A,(ui)i∈I).
The utility player i gets from choosing one of these actions depends on
the behavior of his neighboring players. Let α = (αi)i∈I ∈ AI de-
note an action proﬁle of the population. A population state is a pair
ω = (α, g) ∈ AI ×G[I] ≡ Ω. Given an action proﬁle α, let αa
i = (a,α−i) =
(α1,...,αi−1,a,αi+1,...,αN). Utility of player i at state ω is deﬁned as
πi(α, g) ≡ πi(ω) = ∑
j∈N i(g)
ui(αi,αj). (2.1)
2.1 Co-evolution with noise
In the spirit of Young (1993) and Ellison (2000), we call a co-evolutionary







, β ∈ R+,
where
• Ω is some ﬁnite or countable inﬁnite set describing the state space
of the system,
• Xβ = (X
β
n)n∈N0 is a family of Ω-valued random variables, indexed
by a discrete time parameter n and a noise parameter β,
3In principle every individual could have his own action set. This would require
more notation, and does not contribute anything to this paper.
6• F is a σ-algebra on Ω (e.g. F = 2Ω the set of all subsets of Ω if the
state space is ﬁnite),
• P : F → [0,1] a probability measure.
A realization {X
β
n = ω} deﬁnes an action proﬁle α and a network g. The







n−1 = ω} holds, the probability that the process visits state ω0
in the next period depends only on ω, i.e.
P(X
β




n−1 = ω) ≡ Kβ(ω,ω0), (2.2)
where Kβ : Ω2 → [0,1] is the transition probability function of the sto-
chastic process Xβ. Denote by Kβ := [Kβ(ω,ω0)](ω,ω0)∈Ω2 the transition
matrix of the process Xβ. Assume that these probabilities vary continu-
ously with the noise parameter β. For β → 0 we obtain the unperturbed
Markov chain M = (Ω,F,P,(Xn)n∈N0), with corresponding transition
matrix K. Denote by L1,...,Lk the k-recurrent classes of the unperturbed
process M, and < =
Sk
σ=1 Lσ the union of the recurrent classes of M. By
the decomposition theorem Ω = Q ∪ <, where Q is the class of transient
states in the unperturbed process.
Given the current state {X
β
n = ω}, the following 3 events may take place:
Action adjustment: With probability q1(ω) ∈ [0,1] the action proﬁle α
changes. Let ν ≥ 0 denote the rate with which player i receives an
action revision opportunity.4 Deﬁne the volume of the action adjust-
ment process as Nν. The probability that player i gets a revision
opportunity is deﬁned as 1/N. Denote by bi,β(·|ω) a probabilistic
behavioral rule describing how player i selects an action, given the
population state ω. Speciﬁcally, assume that this behavioral rule
satisﬁes the two “axioms”:
4Assuming that this rate is heterogeneous is possible, but this is the basic assumption
made in the literature.
7(A1) For all i ∈ I and β > 0, bi,β(·|ω) is a full support distribution
on A.
(A2) For all i ∈ I there exists a cost function ci














i, g) + o(1))

where o(1) represents terms that go to 0 as β → 0.
As β → 0 the probability that player i makes a costly decision con-
verges to 0 at exponential rate. A costless transition will be made
even in the zero noise limit. Observe that the revision processes
of Kandori et al. (1993) and Blume (1993), or adaptive learning of
Young (1998) satisﬁes all these assumptions.5
Link creation: With unconditional probability q2(ω) the process allows
the network to expand. For all i ∈ I deﬁne a rate function λi : Ω →
R+, satisfying κi(ω) = N − 1 ⇒ λi(ω) = 0. The volume of the link
creation process is deﬁned as the sum of all rate functions ¯ λ(ω) :=
∑i∈I λi(ω). The conditional probability that player i receives the
chance to form a link is λi(ω)/¯ λ(ω). Conditional on this event,
player i computes a tuple wi,β(ω) := (w
i,β
j (ω))j∈I, satisfying:




i (ω)} > 0. If gij = 1
or i = j, then w
i,β
j (ω) = w
j,β
i (ω) = 0 for all β,
5(A1) and (A2) are the most basic assumptions. An appealing additional requirement
would be
(A3) (∀i ∈ I) : ci
1(ω,(αa




which says that only suboptimal choices have positive transition costs. In this sense,
players use noisy best response rules (see Sandholm, 2009). However, for the general
discussion such an assumption is not necessary.
8(L2) (∀i ∈ I)(∀ω ∈ Ω) : ∑j∈I w
i,β
j (ω) = 1




j (ω) = ci
2(ω,(α, g⊕(i, j))).
ci
2 : Ω2 → R+ is again a cost function for player i. Condition (L1)
says that all neutral edges have a positive probability of becoming
created for β > 0. This is an irreducibility assumption. (L3) is a
large deviation assumption on the link creation probability.
Let Wβ(ω) = ¯ λ(ω)−1 diag[λ1(ω),...,λN(ω)][w
i,β
j ]i,j∈I denote the





wi,β(ω).7 Next, deﬁne the symmetric
matrix ¯ Wβ(ω) := [ ¯ w
β
ij(ω)]i,j∈I = Wβ(ω) + Wβ(ω)>.8 The scalar
¯ w
β
ij(ω) is the conditional probability that the passive edge (i, j) is
formed, starting from ω.
Link destruction: With unconditional probability q3(ω) a link becomes
destroyed. Let ξ ≥ 0 denote the constant rate of link destruction.9
A positive level of volatility will imply that, independent of β, there
is always a chance that a link becomes destroyed. Additionally to
this drift term, let us assign to each edge (i, j) a weight v
β
ij(ω). The
higher the weight of an active edge, the larger will be the conditional
probability that it becomes destroyed. Let Vβ(ω) = [v
β
ij(ω)]1≤i,j≤N
the N × N matrix of edge weights, satisfying:
(D1) Vβ(ω) is a symmetric matrix, and, for β > 0, v
β
ij(ω) > 0 if
gij = 1, and v
β
ij(ω) = 0 for gij = 0,
6diag[x1,...,xn] is the n × n diagonal matrix having xi as entry in its i-th principal
diagonal and 0 off the principal diagonal.
7Note that the above conditions on the distribution wi,β requires that a completely
connected individual puts weight 1 one himself. This causes no trouble because such
players do not get a link creation opportunity by default. Hence the algorithm produces
simple graphs, i.e. graphs that have no multiple connections and self-loops, as desired.
8W> is the transposition of W.











3 (ω,(α, g 	 (i, j))).
(D1) says that edges (i, j) and (j,i) are treated symmetrically. This
is a natural assumption for undirected graphs. Moreover, it requires
that all currently active edges are destroyed with positive probabil-
ity if β > 0. (D2) requires that, conditional on the event of link
destruction, the expected number of destroyed edges is 1. (D3) is
our large deviation assumption. The volume of the link destruction
process is deﬁned as ¯ ξ(ω) := ξ f(ω,Vβ), where f(·,·) is a bounded
non-negative function, normalized by the condition f(ω,Vβ) = 0 if
the network is the empty graph at ω.10
Let ω = (α, g) be the current population state. Deﬁne
Λ(ω) = Nν + ¯ λ(ω) + ¯ ξ(ω). (2.4)
By the frequency interpretation of probabilities, one can interpret the
number Nν =: τa as the time scale of action adjustment events, and
¯ λ(ω) + ¯ ξ(ω) =: τg as the time scale of network evolution. The ratio
τ = τg/τa measures how fast network evolution is, relative to action ad-
justment. If τ is much larger than 1, network evolution will proceed at
a faster time scale than action adjustment. If τ is much smaller than 1
then action adjustment opportunities arrive much more frequently to the
population. The probabilities qσ(ω),σ = 1,2,3, specifying the timing of







, q3(ω) = 1− q1(ω) − q2(ω). (2.5)
10The reason why a positive rate of link destruction is needed is to exclude trivial
stationary states where all players are completely connected. Of course, assuming ξ > 0
does not exclude the complete graph of being a stationary state. Henceforth assume that
ξ > 0 and ﬁxed, so that β is the only varying parameter.
10The elements of the transition matrix Kβ are then given by
Kβ(ω,ω0) =

     
     
q1(ω) 1




i,j(ω) if ω0 = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)),
q3(ω)v
β
ij(ω) if ω0 = (α, g 	 (i, j)),
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
It is easy to verify that ∑ω0∈Ω Kβ(ω,ω0) = q1(ω) + q2(ω) + q3(ω) = 1
for all ω ∈ Ω. By the irreducibility assumptions (A1), (L1) and (D1),
the matrix Kβ is irreducible for (β,ξ)  (0,0). Further, it is easy to
see that the chain is aperiodic. Since Ω is a ﬁnite set, ergodicity of the
process Xβ is guaranteed. Hence, provided β > 0, there exists a unique
invariant distribution µβ ∈ ∆(Ω). It is well known that for β → 0 the
process concentrates on a subset of <. To classify such states, we use the
following deﬁnition of stochastic stability. 11
Deﬁnition 1 (Sandholm (2009)). Given a co-evolutionary model with noise
Mβ, we call a state ω ∈ Ω stochastically stable if
lim
β→0
βlogµβ(ω) = 0. (2.7)
Let Ω∗ denote the set of stochastically stable states.
2.2 On trees, graphs and stochastic stability
At every point of time the process may undertake one of three differ-
ent transitions. The most appealing way to think about the stochastic
dynamic is in terms of directed graphs, as done by Kandori et al. (1993),
Young (1993), building on the work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998). Every
11Most models using stochastic evolutionary dynamics call a state stochastically stable
if it receives positive weight in the limit distribution. Deﬁnition 1 says that ω is stochas-
tically stable if logµβ(ω) → a < 0 as β ↓ 0. This is a weaker requirement than the
conventional stochastic stability criterion, since it may well be that the mass converges
to 0 at a sub-exponential rate. See Sandholm (2009, ch. 12), for a detailed discussion.
11co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ can be analyzed via directed graphs
of the form T = (Ω,~ E). The vertex set of such graphs is the state space
and the edge set is a subset of Ω2. A graph T will be called a revision
graph, and we will henceforth identify every revision graph with its edge
set ~ E(T) by taking the vertex set always to be Ω.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ and a revision
graph T, deﬁne the reach of state ω ∈ Ω under T as the set
RT(ω) := {ω0 ∈ Ω|(∃~ e ∈ ~ E(T)) :~ e = (ω,ω0)}.
The reach of a state is thus the collection of states that the process may
visit after one step under the revision graph T, starting from ω. The reach
of a state ω can be subdivided as follows; call RT,1(ω) the set of states in
the reach of ω that differ in the action conﬁguration, RT,2(ω) the set of
states that are reachable from ω by creation of a single link, and ﬁnally
RT,3(ω) the set of states reachable from ω by deleting a single link. 12
We will work with the following special class of revision graphs. Their
role has also been emphasized by Samuelson (1997), Catoni (1999), Beggs
(2005) and Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2007).
Deﬁnition 3. Consider a non-empty set X ⊂ Ω. A revision graph T is called a
X-revision graph if it is an element of the class of graphs T (X), satisfying
(i) (∀ω ∈ Ω) : |RT(ω)| = 1{ω/ ∈X},
(ii) T does not contain a cycle.
A labeled ω-revision tree (Tω,`) is a {ω}-revision graph Tω ∈ T ({ω}) ≡ Tω
together with a labeling function ` : ~ E(Tω) → I(2) satisfying
(iii) for all edges~ e, `(~ e) returns the pair of players (i, j) involved in the tran-
sition modeled by the edge~ e ∈ ~ E(Tω). If j = i then we interpret the pair
(i,i) as i.
12Obviously RT(ω) = RT,1(ω) ∪ RT,2(ω) ∪ RT,3(ω).
12A X-revision graph T ∈ T (X) joins every point in Ω \ X to X, without
loops. In the main text of the paper we will only need the concept of
labeled revision trees. The more general concept of and X-revision graph
will be used in Appendix B. For this class of revision graphs, conditions
(i) and (ii) are a version of the standard graph-constructs of Freidlin and
Wentzell (1998), and merely assert that Tω is a tree with root ω. The
distinguishing point in the deﬁnition of a labeled revision tree is exactly
the labeling function, whose purpose will become clear later on.13 For a
given ω-revision tree (Tω,`) ∈ Tω, deﬁne the set
STω,σ := {~ e = (ω0,ω00) ∈ ~ E(Tω)|ω00 ∈ RTω,σ(ω0)}, σ ∈ {1,2,3},
which is the collection of all edges used on a transition of type σ ∈
{1,2,3}. By deﬁnition we have ~ E(Tω) =
S3
σ=1 STω,σ.
Following Freidlin and Wentzell (1998) we can now completely character-
ize the invariant distribution of the co-evolutionary process. With a slight
abuse of notation deﬁne the numbers









ρβ(ω) : = ∑
(Tω,`)∈Tω
Kβ(Tω).
Theorem 2.1 (The Markov chain tree theorem). For β > 0, the unique
invariant distribution of the co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ is given by




Proof. See Section B in the appendix. This follows immediately from Frei-
dlin and Wentzell (1998) (Lemma 3.1, Chapter 6). This representation
holds for every irreducible Markov chain, and is not restricted to the cur-
rent model. See Young (1998) or Sandholm (2009) for alternative elegant
proofs of this fact.
13For the current type of stochastic process, the labeling function is uniquely deﬁned
for a given revision tree Tω. See Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2007) for a process where this
need not be the case.
13Consider a state ω ∈ Ω with revision tree (Tω,`). By construction of the
transition probabilities, for every edge~ e ∈ STω,σ,σ = 1,2,3 there exists a
derived cost function ˆ cσ : Ω2 → R+ ∪ {+∞}, such that





(ˆ cσ(~ e) + o(1))

, σ ∈ {1,2,3},
depending on the type of transition under the edge~ e.14 If the transition
~ e ∈ STω,σ is not possible for β > 0, then set ˆ cσ(~ e) = ∞. Deﬁne the derived







ˆ cσ(~ e), (2.9)
so that Kβ(Tω) = exp
h
1
β( ˆ C(Tω) + o(1))
i
. The stochastic potential of state




We are now ready to present a fairly general result characterizing the low-
noise behavior of the invariant distribution (see also Catoni, 1999, Beggs,
2005).
Proposition 2.1. Consider a co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ with derived
cost functions ˆ c = (ˆ c1, ˆ c2, ˆ c3) and invariant distribution µβ. Let γ : Ω → R+
be the potential function deﬁned in eq. (2.10). For all ω ∈ Ω we have
− lim
β→0
βlogµβ(ω) = γ(ω) − min
ω0∈Ω
γ(ω0). (2.11)
Before proving this proposition we need some additional facts. Order the
factors in the invariant measure ρβ according to their leading terms as
14Derived cost functions will be used in this paper only for the link creation process.
In the action revision process one would also need a derived cost function to account for
the unlikelihood of a transition when one would apply the learning model of Alós-Ferrer
and Netzer (2007) (see their concept of the waste of a labeled revision tree).








  ˆ C(Tω) + o(1)

= Bω exp(−γ(ω)/β)(1+ o(1))
where Bω is a real constant. For sufﬁciently small β, the invariant distri-







The following simple fact is a useful intermediate result, as it identiﬁes
the leading term of the denominator in (2.12).
Lemma 2.1. Given two ﬁnite sequences (f(1),..., f(n)), (B1,...,Bn) of non-



















f(i). By absorbing states
with equal values of f(i) in the constant Bi we can, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that all values are different. The denominator is thus
log(Bn exp(−f(n)/β)). Write the polynomial inside log(·) in the numer-















and βlogr(β) → 0 as β → 0. Hence, the ratio (2.13) can be written as
βlogBn + βlogr(β) − f(n)
βlogBn − f(n)
→ 1,as β → 0.
15Proof of Proposition 2.1. Start from eq. (2.12). Take logarithms and multi-
ply both sides by −β to arrive at








The claim now follows from Lemma 2.1.
This shows that a state is stochastically stable according to Deﬁnition 1 iff
it is a state with minimal stochastic potential.
Corollary 2.1. Ω∗ = {ω ∈ Ω|γ(ω) = minω0∈Ω γ(ω0)}.
We see that the main difference between a co-evolutionary model with
noise and a classical evolutionary model is the addition of two further
cost functions, corresponding to the two added processes modeling the
evolution of the network. Departing from here it is easy to see that all
well-known results on stochastic stability are applicable. Referring to
Appendix B for proofs of these facts, we just introduce some concepts in
order to ﬁx the notation.15 Let X,X 0 be some non-empty subsets of Ω.
A (ω,ω0)-path is a directed graph whose vertex set is a non-repeating
sequence of states {ω1,...,ωl} such that ω1 = ω,ωl = ω0,ωt / ∈ X 0,∀t ∈
[2,l − 1], and whose edges are the transitions (ωi,ωi+1),1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1.
Denote by Pω,ω0(X,X 0) the set of paths connecting ω to ω0, and P one
such path. To each ω,ω0-path there corresponds a labeling function `, as
in Deﬁnition 3. For P ∈ Pω,ω0(X,X 0) let (P,`) denote a (ω,ω0)-revision
path. Let L,L0 be two recurrent classes of the process M, and denote the
cost of transition from recurrent class L to L0 by C(L,L0). The cost of a







15See also Samuelson (1997), Young (1998) or Sandholm (2009) for textbook treatments
of this, or Ellison (2000).
16where ˆ C(P) is deﬁned as in (2.9), applied to a (ω,ω0)-revision path. In
Appendix B we show that all states within one recurrent class are con-
nected by a null cost path. This allows one to study revision graphs
between recurrent classes. Therefore, we introduce the class of revision
graphs ˆ T = ({L1,...,Lk},~ E), where ~ E( ˆ T) ⊆ {L1,...,Lk}2. A L-revision
tree ˆ T ∈ ˆ T (L) is a revision graph in the sense of Deﬁnition 3, but acting
on the recurrent sets of the unperturbed co-evolutionary process M.16
The costs of such a revision tree are deﬁned as C( ˆ T) = ∑~ e∈~ E( ˆ T) C(~ e), with
~ e = (L0,L00). Letting ˆ γ : < → R+ be a potential function on the set of
recurrent classes, one can show (see Appendix B) that for all ω ∈ L
γ(ω) = ˆ γ(L) = min
ˆ T∈ ˆ T (L)
C( ˆ T). (2.15)
3 Applications
In this section we apply the above general framework to some recent
models. In both models we consider the base game Γ = (I,{a1,a2},u),
with normal form
a1 a2
a1 (e − φ,e − φ) (f − φ, g − φ)
a2 (g − φ, f − φ) (h − φ,h − φ)
(3.1)
Assume that h > e > f > g but e + f > h + g. This means that (a1,a1)
is a risk-dominant strict Nash equilibrium, while (a2,a2) is a Pareto ef-
ﬁcient strict Nash equilibrium. The number φ ≥ 0 is a fee two incident
players have to pay in order to play the game. It does not alter the nature
of the game, but possibly affects the way how players form their social
network. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where a1 is played
with probability x =
h−f
e−g+h−f < 1/2.
16This method of reducing the process to recurrent classes and monitoring transitions
only between them has been proposed by Young (1993).
173.1 A volatility model
In Staudigl (2009b) a volatility model for general potential games is pre-
sented. Here we study a version of this model in the context of the sym-
metric coordination game (3.1) with φ = 0. The co-evolutionary model
with noise Mβ is the following;










, σ = 1,2. (3.2)
This behavioral rule satisﬁes (A2) with cost function
ˆ c1(ω,(αa
i, g)) = ci
1(ω,(αa
1, g)) = max
a0∈A
πi(αa0
i , g) − πi(αa
i, g). (3.3)
Link creation: Assume that λi(ω) = λ1{κi(ω)<N−1}, so that every incom-
pletely connected player receives a link creation opportunity with






∑k/ ∈ ¯ N i(ω) exp(u(αi,αk)/β)
.
(L4) is satisﬁed with cost function
ci
2(ω,(α, g ⊕ (i, j)) = max
k/ ∈ ¯ N i(ω)
u(αi,αk) − u(αi,αj).
Link destruction: Once a link is selected by the process (an event with






ˆ c3(ω,(α, g 	 (i, j))) = c
(i,j)
3 (ω,(α, g 	 (i, j))) ≡ 0.
The volume of this subprocess is given by ¯ ξ = ξe(ω), so that f(ω,Vβ) =
e(ω).17
17In Staudigl (2009a) the agents have idiosyncratic preferences over the actions, which
18It remains to determine the derived cost function ˆ c2. When a link be-
comes created, a pair of players (i, j) is involved with j > i. Suppose
this event is on the ω-revision tree (Tω,`), and call the edge of transition
corresponding to this event ~ e. The labeling function returns the pair of
players `(~ e) = (i, j). Let `(~ e)− be the player with the lower index involved
in the transition~ e, i.e. i, and `(~ e)+ the player with the higher index, i.e.
j.18
Lemma 3.1. For every ω ∈ Ω and (Tω,`) ∈ Tω, the derived cost of a transition
~ e ∈ STω,2 is




2 (~ e)}. (3.4)








j (ω) + w
j,β
i (ω)).
By the large deviation principle (L4), for small β we have
w
i,β
j (ω) + w
j,β















2(ω,(α, g ⊕ (i, j))) + o(1))

,
and so we can apply Lemma 2.1, which gives us the desired result.
Thus, for every ω ∈ Ω the cost of a revision tree (Tω,`) ∈ Tω is ˆ C(Tω) =
∑
2
σ=1 ∑~ e∈STω,σ ˆ cσ(~ e).
is interpreted as the “type” of the agent. Link decay probabilities are then func-







klgkl, for given functions { ˆ ξ
β
ij}, which depend on the realized types of the
agents and on β > 0. The corresponding volume is now ¯ ξ(ω) = ∑j>i ˆ ξ
β
ijgij.
18I thank Stefano DeMichelis for giving me the right hint for the following proof of
the following Lemma.
193.1.1 Recurrent classes and stochastic stability
Deﬁne the set
˜ Ω = {ω ∈ Ω|gij = 1 ⇒ αi = αj}.
A network in this set has only edges between two coordinated players. It
may have several connected components and, in particular, it may not be
completely connected. Distinguished classes of states in ˜ Ω are the global
conformity sets
Lσ = {ω ∈ ˜ Ω|(∀i ∈ I) : αi = aσ}, σ = 1,2.
Let L1,2 = ˜ Ω \ (L1 ∪ L2), the co-existence set. The following Lemma char-
acterizes the recurrent classes < of the unperturbed process.
Lemma 3.2. Consider the unperturbed co-evolutionary model M of Staudigl
(2009b). We have < = ˜ Ω.
Proof. The proof proceeds by a fairly general constructive argument, which
is presented in Appendix A.
We see that the process allows for global heterogeneity, since there may
be multiple connected components displaying different types of conven-
tions. However, within every connected component we must have local
conformity. Due to this large number of equilibria, we hope that the con-
cept of stochastic stability gives us some hint which states are more likely
to be observed in the long-run. The following proposition shows that this
is not the case.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the coordination game (3.1) with φ = 0, and the
co-evolutionary model with noise Mβ of Staudigl (2009b). We have Ω∗ = <.
Proof. Fix ω ∈ L1,ω0 ∈ L2. We will construct a zero cost path P ∈
Pω,ω0(L1,L2), which implies C(L1,L2) = 0. A symmetric argument
shows that C(L2,L1) = 0, so that γ(ω) = γ(ω0) = 0. From this it follows
that γ(ω00) = 0 for all ω00 ∈ L1,2, since all paths from ω to ω0 must pass
through some state ω00 ∈ L1,2.
20Step 1: From ω apply a sequence of link destruction events. All this has
zero costs and in ﬁnitely many steps we arrive at state ˆ ω ∈ L1 with
the empty network.
Step 2: Give two randomly chosen players sequentially an action adjust-
ment opportunity where they switch to a2. This has zero costs, since
a loner selects both actions with equal probability.
Step 3: Give one of the two players a link creation opportunity. Under K
a link between them will be established. We are now at a state in
L1,2.
Step 4: Give the remaining players action adjustment opportunities where
they switch to a2, and then a link creation opportunity. Iterate this
until the process arrives at the desired state ω0 ∈ L2.
Steps 1-4 deﬁnes a path from ω to ω0 having zero costs. Clearly all steps
are reversible, i.e. steps 4-1 deﬁne a path from ω0 to ω having zero costs.
This demonstrates γ(ω) = γ(ω0) = 0.
3.2 A classical model
We discuss a slight variation of Jackson and Watts (2002). To get the
most interesting scenario, we reduce the set of admissible parameters in
requiring that x > 1
N−1 and φ ∈ (g,e). This paper takes the mistakes
model of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) as universal behavioral
rule. Parameterizing noise as ε = exp(−1/β), and henceforth calling
ε the noise parameter, allows us to study this behavioral rule. The co-
evolutionary model with noise Mε is as follows:
Action adjustment: Assume that each player receives with uniform prob-
ability 1/N the opportunity to change his action. Conditional on






2 if αi 6= a and {a} = argmaxa0∈A πi(αa0
i , g),
1− ε




This behavioral rule says that a player abandons his currently used
action with relatively high probability, if there exists a strictly better
action. Otherwise he sticks to his action and switches only with the
relatively small probability ε. This behavioral rule satisﬁes condition
(A2) with cost function
ˆ c1(ω,(αa






0 if αi 6= a and {a} = argmaxa0∈A πi(αa0
i , g),
0 if αi = a and {αi} = argmaxa0∈A πi(αa0
i , g),
1 otherwise.
Link creation: Jackson and Watts (2002) introduce a cooperative element
into the link creation process. To capture this, we have to make a
slight modiﬁcation in the construction of our co-evolutionary model
with noise. Let D(ω) denote the set of neutral links at ω and d(ω)
its cardinality. Instead of the individual players’ rate functions, as-
sume that the event of link creation arrives to the society at the
constant rate ¯ λ(ω) := λd(ω), where λ is a positive constant. Deﬁne
the events
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) : Ai
j(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω|u(αi,αj) ≥ φ}.
If ω ∈ Ai
j(φ) then the edge (i, j) is proﬁtable from the point of view








Following the spirit of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996), assume that a neutral link is set to be active with probability
1 − ε if both players mutually agree. With the small probability ε
22assume that all links have a chance to be formed. The (conditional)
probability that a neutral edge (i, j) will be added is















The term ε/d(ω) is the “background noise” of the system, and gives
the uniform probability that a link will be formed. If edge (i, j) is
neutral at ω, but both players are not hurt by the creation of the
link, then they will independently agree to form it with the high
probability 1 − ε, which increases their chance of being formed.19
Let ¯ A denote the complementary set of A. The cost function of this
sub-process is




Link destruction: With rate ξ > 0 links become destroyed. Conditional
on this event, pick one edge (i, j) ∈ E(ω) with uniform probability,
and allow the incident players to re-evaluate the beneﬁts arising
from this connection. This leads to ¯ ξ(ω) := ξe(ω). Denote by






the number of active links where at least one player beneﬁts from
the deletion of the link. If (i, j) is a link where at least one player
is better off after its destruction, suppose that with large probability
19Jackson and Watts (2002) assume that a link is created with probability 1−ε iff it is a
strict Pareto improvement, i.e. at least one player is strictly better off after the connection
has been established and no player is hurt from the creation of the link. We assume that
a link is already formed if it is a weak Pareto improvement, i.e. no party is hurt by the
formation of the link. Additionally, they assume that the error probability ε is not the
same in the action evolution process as it is in the graph evolution process. However, it
is required that the error probabilities go to zero at the same rate so not to get “twisted”
equilibrium selection results, as argued by Bergin and Lipman (1996).
231−ε it will be destroyed. With the small probability ε every link can
be destroyed once it has been selected. This leads to the following
version of link destruction probabilities






¯ m(ω) + ε






The cost function of this process is given by





3.2.1 Recurrent classes and stochastically stable states
Deﬁne I1(ω) = {i ∈ I|αi = a1 on ω}, and for every 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 2,
Ln







Lσ = {ω ∈ Ω|(∀i ∈ I) : αi = aσ & g = gc[I]}, σ = 1,2.
Lemma 3.3. Let M be the unperturbed co-evolutionary process of Jackson and
Watts (2002) with φ ∈ (g,e). Then
< = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L1,2.
Proof. The algorithm in appendix A shows that in ﬁnite time there are no
links between agents playing different actions. Call ωm the state at which
the algorithm stops. In the unperturbed model, with probability 1, only
links which are mutually proﬁtable are formed and links which harm at
least one player are destroyed. At ωm no player has an incentive to change
his action. If a link creation event takes place, with conditional probability
1 only an edge is formed if the selected pair is in the same action class
Iσ(ωm),σ = 1,2. Moreover, these links never become destroyed. A link
24destruction event at ωm leaves the state invariant with probability 1, since
at this state no edges between players from different action classes exist.
For the same reason, an action adjutment event leaves ωm invariant, with
probability 1.If Iσ(ωm) = ∅ for a σ = 1,2, then the process arrives at a
state where global conformity prevails. Otherwise the process leads to a
state in the co-existence set L1,2.
To select among the recurrent sets, we now perform an analysis via sto-
chastic stability.
Proposition 3.2. Let Mβ be the co-evolutionary model with noise of Jackson
and Watts (2002). Then for φ ∈ (g,e) and x ≥ 1
N−1
Ω∗ = L1 ∪ L2.
Proof. We will explicitly calculate the potentials of the three recurrent
classes and show that, under the stated parameter assumptions, ˆ γ(L1) =
ˆ γ(L2) < ˆ γ(Ln
1,2) for all 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 2.
Let ω ∈ L1,ω0 ∈ L2. Observe that, under the assumption x ≥ 1
N−1, at
least two agents must change their action to enter L1,2 via an unperturbed





1,2 ) = 1, since a single deviator reduces/increases the set
of a1 players, and applying then link creation/destruction leads to some
20To see this, note that C(L1,L2
1,2) = 2 by deﬁnition of risk dominance. To get
C(L2,LN−2
1,2 ) = 2 suppose that one player deviates from ω0 ∈ L2 and plays a1. The
network remains unchanged. Apply the action adjustment process in the next period
to a current a2 player. This player will switch to a1 iff e + (N − 2)f − φ(N − 1) >
g + (N − 2)h + φ(N − 1), or iff x < 1/(N − 1). Since we assume that x ≥ 1/(N − 1)
another tremble is needed to make a1 a best response.
25state in the desired recurrent class. It follows that











= 2+ (N − 3− 2+ 1) = N − 2









1,2 ) + C(LN−2
1,2 ,L2)






















= 2+ 2+ (n − 1− 2+ 1) + (N − n − 1− 2+ 1) = N
4 A micro-founded model for inhomogeneous ran-
dom graphs.
The theory of random graphs provides in essence 2 classes of models;
the “randomly grown graphs”, mostly using a version of preferential at-
tachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999), and generalized random graphs
(Newman, 2003). Under some additional assumptions on the structure of
the Markov chain (2.6), we are able to characterize the induced ensemble
of random graphs for general behavioral rules.
Let us add the following two assumptions on the structure of the transi-
tion probabilities:
(L4) (∀i ∈ I) : λi(ω) = λ1{κi(ω)<N−1};
(L5) (∀i.j ∈ I) : w
i,β
j (ω) = ˆ w
i,β
j (α)(1 − gij), where ˆ w
i,β
j (·) satisﬁes (L1)-
(L3).
26(L4) deﬁnes the volume of the link creation subprocess as ¯ λ(ω) = λ∑i∈I 1{κi(ω)<N−1}.
In the link destruction process we demand additionally







(D2) tells us that f(ω,Vβ) = ∑j>i ˆ v
β
ij(α)gij.
Using these additional assumptions we will derive a random graph process,




n=0 denote the random graph process with transition probabilities
K
β
2,3 : G[I] × G[I] → [0,1], deﬁned as
K
β
2,3(g, g0) = P( ˜ G
β





n+1 = (α, g0)|X
β





n = (α, g))
P(X
β
n+1 = (α, g0)|X
β
n = (α, g))
=
1
q2(α, g) + q3(α, g)
Kβ((α, g),(α, g0))












j (α) + ˆ w
j,β
i (α)) if g0 = g ⊕ (i, j),
ξ ˆ v
β
ij(α) if g0 = g 	 (i, j),
0 otherwise.
This chain is irreducible but no longer aperiodic. It serves as a jump chain
of the continuous-time random graph process ( ˜ Gβ(t))t≥0 with generator22
η
β
2,3(g → g0) = (q2(α, g) + q3(α, g))(K
β
2,3(g, g0) − δg,g0) (4.1)
where δg,g0 = 1 iff g = g0, and 0 otherwise. This continuous time
process allows us to identify the invariant distribution of the original
21An interpretation of such a process can be given by assuming that action adjustment
is a relatively fast process compared to network evolution. In this case, it makes sense
to assume that the proﬁle α reaches a temporary stationary state for a given network g,
and when evolution shapes the network the proﬁle α is ﬁxed.
22See Norris (1997).
27Markov chain in a simple way. Let Id denote the identity matrix on










call ˆ q(g) := q2(α, g) + q3(α, g), and ˆ q := [ˆ q2(g)]g∈G[I]. The generator of
the continuous-time process ( ˜ Gβ(t))t≥0 is deﬁned by η
β
2,3 = ˆ q(K
β
2,3 − Id).






Lemma 4.1. The following are equivalent:





2,3 = µ where µ(g) = ν(g)ˆ q(g).
Proof. Deﬁne the measure µ(g) := ν(g)ˆ q(g) for all g ∈ G[I]. For all g, g0
we have η
β
2,3(g → g0) = ˆ q(g)(K
β















The next proposition characterizes the invariant distribution of the continuous-
time random graph process.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the random graph process ( ˜ Gβ(t))t≥0 with generator














with the edge-success probability










j (α) + ˆ w
j,β




28Proof. The Markov process ( ˜ Gβ(t))t≥0 is irreducible for β > 0 and re-






2,3(g → g ⊕ (i, j)) = ˆ µ
β
2,3(g ⊕ (i, j)|α)η
β
2,3(g ⊕ (i, j) → g)




























Let ¯ ˆ w
β
ij(α) := ˆ w
i,β
j (α) + ˆ w
j,β














ther, deﬁne the Hamiltonian Hβ(g|α) := ∑i,j>i θ
β






















































λ ¯ ˆ w
β
ij(α)
λ ¯ ˆ w
β




Collecting terms and doing some simple manipulations gives the desired
result.
This strong result gives a full characterization of the induced ensem-
ble of random graphs for volatility models such as Marsili et al. (2004),
Ehrhardt et al. (2008a;b). It further establishes an interesting and surpris-
ing connection with the inhomogeneous random graph models proposed
by Söderberg (2002), Park and Newman (2004) or Bollobás et al. (2007).
29Any co-evolutionary model with noise, satisfying the set of assumptions
(A1)-(A2), (L1)-(L5) and (D1-D4) will generate an inhomogeneous ran-
dom graph, with edge-success probabilities (4.3).




























Proof. This follows form Lemma 4.1.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a general framework for studying co-evolutionary
models with noise. We gave a complete characterization of the invariant
distribution of such a model, which is a joint probability distribution on
the set of action proﬁles and the set of networks. By means of two exam-
ples, a volatility model akin to Ehrhardt et al. (2008b), Staudigl (2009b)
and a classical model based on Jackson and Watts (2002), we have shown
how the uniﬁed approach is useful to make a systematic investigation of
co-evolutionary models. Beside presenting a uniﬁed formalism to per-
form the by now important equilibrium selection technique of stochastic
stability, we have demonstrated that a co-evolutionary model with noise
generates an inhomogeneous random graph ensemble for the long run
interaction structure of the population. The main result in this direction
provides a closed form solution for the probability measure of this graph
ensemble, and presents the general form for edge-success probabilities.
Based on this novel insight, there are many new questions arise.
First, the edge success probabilities depend only on the behavioral rules
30the agents are assumed to employ. It would be interesting to see what
differences between networks of this ensemble arise by assuming differ-
ent behavioral rules. For instance, do best-responding agents tempt to
self-organize in more structured and efﬁcient network topologies as imi-
tative agents? What role plays the underlying noise structure of the model
(meant here as the interplay between behavioral noise β and overall net-
work volatility ξ)? Second, the literature on social and epidemic diffu-
sion (see e.g. Morris, 2000, Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2008, Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani, 2001) have emphasized the importance of the
network architecture in order to understand the phenomenon of con-
tagion. In particular, notions of network clustering and cohesiveness
have turned out to be important. We do not yet know the statistics
produced by a co-evolutionary model. Third, in the context of volatil-
ity models Ehrhardt et al. (2008a) ﬁnd three interesting dynamic effects;
Resilience, Equilibrium co-existence and phase transitions (i.e. a discon-
tinuous switch in the connectivity of the network by a slight change of
the parameters affecting the edge success probability). Under what para-
meter conﬁgurations are these phenomena reproduced in the framework
of a co-evolutionary model? The recent work by Bollobás et al. (2007)
studies inhomogeneous random graphs and detects also a phase transi-
tion in network connectivity by exploring the size of components with a
branching process approximation.
A Proof of Lemma 3.2
We ﬁrst show that if ω ∈ <, then there is no positive probability path under K
that leads out of this set. Under ω every connected pair of players is coordinated.
Let i be a current a1 player. Every player in the component to which i belongs
must then also play a1.23 Hence, every graph corresponding to ω ∈ Ω∗ must
consist of ﬁnitely many components, each characterized by behavioral confor-
23If j would be a player in the component who plays a2 he cannot be linked with a
player who is path connected with i.
31mity. By deﬁnition, applying K to such a state will not lead to a state outside
Ω∗.
Now consider a state ω / ∈ <. To show that such a state is transient under K, we
have to ﬁnd a positive probability path under K that leads to some state ω0 ∈ <,
but no path from < can be constructed that goes to ω. It is easy to see that
once the unperturbed process is in < there is no positive probability path that
leads the process out of it, so one direction of the proof is already shown. For
the other direction, the following algorithm constructs an (ω,ω0)-path in ﬁnitely
many steps;
Let ω0 = ω be our initial state. The set of uncoordinated edges E(I1(ω0),I2(ω0)) 6=
∅, by hypothesis.24 Let t = 0,1,2,...,m measure the number of iterations of the
algorithm. Start from t = 0. The algorithm generates a sequence {ωt}m
t=0, where
the transition from ωt to ωt+1 proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Pick the ﬁrst edge from this set. Let one of the two involved players
receive an action adjustment opportunity where he switches only to an
action that gives him a strictly larger payoff compared to ωt.25 If this
player changes his action, delete the edge from the list of uncoordinated
edges, and call the resulting state ωt+1. Then repeat Step 1. If the player
does not change his action, go to Step 2.
Step 2: Give the other player an action adjustment opportunity as in Step 1. If
he changes his action, delete the edge from the list of uncoordinated edges
and call the resulting state ωt+1. Then repeat Step 1. If the player does not
change his action, go to Step 3.
Step 3: Delete the edge by a targeted link destruction event.26 Call the resulting
state ωt+1 and note that the set of uncoordinated edges decreased by 1. Go
to Step 4.27
24This is the set of links that connect players from I1(ω) to players in I2(ω). Iσ(ω) is
the set of aσ-players at ω.
25In 2 × 2 games with ﬁnite populations this choice rule is generically equivalent to
demanding that a play switches to a best-response.
26Note that this is always a zero-cost step.
27An intermediate stage could be added to the algorithm, where we apply K to ωt+1
by letting the involved players create a link. This will lead to the creation of maximally
32Step 4: Order the edges in E(I1(ωt+1),I2(ωt+1)) in some way. If this set is
empty exit the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
B The Markov chain tree theorem and set-valued
cost functions
To prove (2.8) we will make use of some general results from the theory of
Markov chains and simulated annealing. Norris (1997) and Grimmett and Stirza-
ker (2001) are good references for the theory of ﬁnite Markov chains, and Catoni
(1999; 2001) collects the relevant results from simulated annealing. Let ω ∈
Ω,x,y,z ∈ Ω \ {ω} and X ⊂ Ω a nonempty set. Denote by Kβ,n the n-fold





0 = x). Let ω ∈ Ω be an arbitrary ﬁxed state and deﬁne its ﬁrst
passage time as the random variable
τ(ω) := inf{n ≥ 1|X
β
n = ω}.
Since ω is recurrent we have P(τ(ω) < ∞|X
β
0 = z) = 1 for all z. Hence, the
process returns to state ω almost surely, independent from where it takes off.
Suppose we start the process from y and want to keep track of the number of














The graph description of ﬁnite Markov chains is useful to calculate this seem-
ingly complicated expression. Recall that a X-revision graph is an element of
the set of graphs T (X), connecting every point in Ω\X to a point in X, without
loops. If X = {ω,x} then T ({ω,x}) contains all graphs which connect points
from Ω \ {ω,x} in a unique way either to ω or x. Denote by Ty,x(X) the set
of X-graphs which contain a path {ω1,...,ωl} such that ω1 = y,ωl = x and
ωt / ∈ X, for all 2 ≤ t ≤ l − 1. If y = x deﬁne Tx,x(X) = T (X). If y ∈ X set
Ty,x(X) = ∅. It is intuitive that (B.1) should be proportional to the probability
2 coordinated links.
33of graphs T ∈ Ty,x({ω,x}). However, we also require to return to ω, so not all
possible paths are allowed. We have to condition on the ω-trees, since these are
the paths that lead in a unique way to ω. This heuristic argument suggests that








Lemma 3.1 of Catoni (1999) gives a rigorous proof of this heuristic.28
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 3.1, Catoni (1999)). Let ¯ Kβ denote the matrix Kβ restricted to



















Before proving this result, we need the following simple observation.
Lemma B.2. For all y,x 6= ω, we have lim
n→∞




¯ Kβ,n(y,x) ≤ P(τ(ω) = ∞|X
β
0 = y) = 0
since ω is a recurrent state.
As a consequence we see that (Id− ¯ Kβ) is invertible. This is interesting, because
for all y,x 6= ω


















Hence, this gives us the expected number of times the process visits x before
hitting ω, which is the quantity we want to compute in Lemma B.1.
28The proof, which is taken from Catoni (1999), extends literally to the case where the
singleton is replaced by a non-empty subset X.






Deﬁne the Kronecker-delta function as δy,x = 1 if y = x and 0 otherwise. We
have to show that for all y,x 6= ω
∑
z6=ω
(δy,z − ¯ Kβ(y,z))M(z,x) = δy,x.
This can be written as
∑
z6=y












Deﬁne the sets C1 := {(z,T)|z 6= y, T ∈ Ty,x({ω,x})} and C2 := {(z,T)|z ∈
Ω \ {ω,y}, T ∈ Tz,x({ω,x})}, so that we can equivalently write
∑
(z,T)∈C1
Kβ(y,z)Kβ(T) = δy,xρβ(ω) + ∑
(z,T)∈C2
Kβ(y,z)Kβ(T). (B.3)
Let us consider the case y = x ﬁrst, so that C1 is deﬁned by the revision graphs
in T ({ω,x}). Then C2 ⊂ C1, since every {ω,x}-revision tree that contains an
(z,x)-path is a {ω,x}-revision graph. The converse, of course, need not apply.
Deﬁne the map
ϕ : C1 \ C2 → Tω,(z,T) 7→ ϕ(z,T) = (Ω,~ E(T) ∪ {(x,z)}).
This operation takes an {ω,x}-revision tree, not containing a (z,x)-path, and
adds the edge (x,z). Thus, from the point z we have to arrive at ω in a unique
way. By adding the edge (x,z) we create an ω-revision tree. If we can show
that ϕ is bijective, then we can move between C1 \ C2 and Tω without losing any
information. For T0 = ϕ(z,T) ∈ Tω, the inverse mapping is
ϕ−1(T0) = (ϕ−1
1 (T0), ϕ−1
2 (T0)) = (RT0(x),~ E(T0)\{(x,RT0(x))}) = (z,~ E(T0)\{(x,z)}).























= ρβ(ω) + ∑
(z,T)∈C2
Kβ(x,z)Kβ(T)
what coincides with the right-hand side of this equation.
Now, consider the case y 6= x. Deﬁne the map ϕ : C1 → C2 by
ϕ(z,T) =
(
(z,T) ,if T ∈ Tz,x({ω,x})
(RT(y),(~ E(T) ∪ {(y,z)}) \ {(y,RT(y))}) ,if T / ∈ Tz,x({ω,x}).
ϕ maps the pair (z,T) onto itself if T contains an (z,x)-path. If such a path does
not exist, then it connects y with z, deletes the (unique) outgoing edge from y,
and shifts the initial vertex of the path from y to its unique neighbor under T,
RT(y). Since there exists a path connecting y with x, the (unique) neighbor of
y on T is also connected with x. Hence, we have constructed a revision tree
T0 ∈ TRT(y),x({ω,x}), with RT(y) ∈ Ω \ {ω,y}.30 If we can show that ϕ is
bijective, then C1 = C2 follows and we are done. We claim
ϕ−1(z,T) =
(
(z,T) if T ∈ Ty,x({ω,x}),
(RT(y),(~ E(T) ∪ {(y,z)}) \ {(y,RT(y))}) if T / ∈ Ty,x({ω,x}).
Then ϕ−1(ϕ(z,T)) = (z,T) for all (z,T) ∈ C1. To see this, start with (z,T) ∈
Tz,x({ω,x}). Then ϕ(z,T) = (z,T) ∈ C2 and T ∈ Ty,x({ω,x}), hence ϕ−1(ϕ(z,T)) =
(z,T). In the case where T / ∈ Tz,x({ω,x}), let us call ϕ(z,T) = (z0,T0) ∈ C2. Then
T0 / ∈ Ty,x({ω,x}), and consequently
ϕ(z0,T0) = (RT0(y),(~ E(T0) ∪ {(y,z0)}) \ {(y,RT0(y))})
= (z,(~ E(T0) ∪ {(y,RT(y))}) \ {(y,z)})
= (z,T).
29Deﬁne 0· ∞ = 0.
30If RT(y) = x then we get the pair (x,T) with T ∈ T ({ω,x}) which lies in C2 for
z = x.














Intuitively, this is the average length of ω-cycles on which x is visited.
Lemma B.3. Let v(ω) denote the vector whose elements are deﬁned by (B.4). Then
(i) vω(ω) = 1;
(ii) v(ω)Kβ = v(ω);
(iii) v(ω) is bounded and positive.
Proof. (i) By deﬁnition.















































(iii) Suppose there exists a state x such that vx(ω) = 0. Then, for all n ≥ 1,
0 = ∑
ω0∈Ω
vω0(ω)Kβ,n(ω0,x) = Kβ,n(ω,x) + ∑
y6=ω
vy(ω)Kβ,n(y,x)
and so Kβ,n(ω,x) = 0, contradicting irreducibility. Essentially the same
argument can be used to see that vx(ω) < ∞ for all x.
37The expected return time to ω is ¯ v(ω) = ∑ω0∈Ω vω0(ω). This is a measure of the
average length of ω-cycles. A state ω is called positive recurrent if ¯ v(ω) < ∞.
Lemma B.4. Let Kβ be irreducible and recurrent. Then Kβ has an invariant distribution
µβ such that µβ({ω}) = µβ(ω) = 1/¯ v(ω).
Proof. Since Ω is ﬁnite, there exists a positive recurrent state ω ∈ Ω. Now,
since the process is irreducible, all states are positive recurrent. Then ¯ v(ω) =
∑ω0∈Ω vω0(ω) < ∞. Since v(ω) deﬁnes an invariant measure for Kβ, µβ =
(1/¯ v(ω))v(ω) is an invariant distribution for Kβ, satisfying µβ(ω) = 1/¯ v(ω).




























































We have for all y 6= ω the identity
E(τ(ω)|X
β














































ρβ(ω) + ∑x6=ω ∑y6=ω Kβ(ω,y)∑T∈Ty,x({ω,x}) Kβ(T)
=
ρβ(ω)
ρβ(ω) + ∑x6=ω ∑Tx∈Tx Kβ(Tx)
which is eq. (2.8).
We now provide some justiﬁcations for the cost functions (2.14). The results
presented here are due to Beggs (2005), who in turn builds on the work of Catoni
(1999). The clue is to consider a modiﬁed Markov chain, which monitors only
transitions in a suitably chosen subset X ⊂ Ω. Therefore, for m ∈ N0, deﬁne the
stopping times of successive visitations of the set X as τ−1(X) ≡ 0, τm(X) :=
inf{n ≥ τm−1(X) + 1|X
β





visitations of Xβ to the set X.
Lemma B.5. Let X ⊂ Ω be a non-empty set. (Z
β
m)m≥0 is an irreducible, recurrent
and time-homogenous Markov chain on X. Its unique invariant distribution is given by

















is the expected number of visitations to z before the restricted process reaches x.
Proof. That the restricted process is a Markov chain with these properties can be
proved quite easily. See Proposition 7.2.1 in Catoni (2001). For the second claim,
note that the strong Markov property (see Norris, 1997), applied to the stopping





































n = ω,τ(X) ≥ n|X
β
0 = z)Kβ(ω,x)
















where we have used in the fourth line an extended version of Lemma B.1.
We will apply this result to derive the set-valued cost functions (2.14). Let
L1,...,Lk denote the recurrent classes of the unperturbed model M and < =
Sk
i=1 Li the union of recurrent classes. The literature often refers to the sets Li as
limit sets. From each limit set we make an arbitrary selection xi ∈ Li,1 ≤ i ≤ k,
and deﬁne X := {x1,...,xk}. Note that X contains the absorbing states (i.e. the
singleton recurrent sets). For y,x ∈ X, let







be the cost function of the restricted process (Z
β
m)m≥0. Further, deﬁne ˆ c∗(ω) :=
miny∈Ω\{ω} ˆ c(ω,y) the least cost transition from some state ω ∈ Ω (omitting the
type of transition).
Lemma B.6. Let X = {x1,...,xk},xi ∈ Li,1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, for all y,x ∈ X, the




where for any path P, ˆ C(P) := ∑~ e∈~ E(P) ˆ c(~ e), and ¯ X = Ω \ X.
40Proof. The proof is based on Lemma 2.1 and the transition probability of the re-
stricted process (Z
β
m) found in Lemma B.5. We know that Kβ(y,x) = exp
h
− 1
β(ˆ c(y,x) + o(1))
i
.
For a given point z ∈ Ω\X, we have to ﬁnd an asymptotic bound for Kβ(y,z)Q
β
Ω\X(y →















β( ˆ C(T) + o(1))
i .
Taking logarithms, and multiplying by −β gives us
ˆ c(y,z) − βlog[Q
β
Ω\X(y → x|z)]. (B.7)





















( ˆ C(T) + o(1))
#
.
Lemma 2.1 tells us that for β ↓ 0 this number is asymptotically equivalent to
max
T∈Tz,x(X)
exp(− ˆ C(T)/β) − max
T∈T (X)
exp(− ˆ C(T)/β).
(B.7) boils then down to
ˆ c(y,z) + min
T∈Tz,x(X)




z,x ∈ Tz,x(X) a least cost X-graph containing an (z,x)-path, and T∗
X ∈
T (X) a least cost X-revision graph. Call P∗ the (z,x) path used on T∗
z,x. We
claim that all edges in T∗
z,x, which are not on the path P∗, are also used under
T∗
X. This follows from the fact that Tz,x(X) ⊂ T (X). The only difference between
the graphs T∗
z,x and T∗
X are the edges on the path P∗ = {ω1,...,ωl},ω1 = z,ωl =
x,ωt / ∈ X,∀t = 2,...,l − 1. The edge (ωt−1,ωt) need not be globally optimal,
so that this edge causes supplementary costs ˆ c(ωt−1,ωt) − ˆ c∗(ωt−1). The term
ˆ c∗(ωt−1) is the cost of the edge leaving ωt−1 under T∗
X. Hence, for any z / ∈ X we







[ˆ c(ωt−1,ωt) − ˆ c∗(ωt−1)] : P = {ω1,...,ωl} ∈ Pz,x(Ω \ X,X)
)
.





ˆ CX(y → x|z)

.
Next, we claim that if ω is used on the optimal path P∗, then ˆ c∗(ω) = 0. To see
this, observe that by deﬁnition of such paths, ω is either a transient state, or it is
a recurrent state, not contained in the selection X. In the ﬁrst case, ˆ c∗(ω) = 0,
since any transient state can be appended to a zero-cost path leading to some
recurrent state. In the second case we also have ˆ c∗(ω) = 0, since ω cannot be
absorbing, hence communicates with another state in the same recurrent class.
Hence, if ω1 is the ﬁrst state on the optimal path P∗ then ˆ c∗(ω1) = 0, and













This Lemma gives us the costs of a transition between two recurrent states y,x.
If y ∈ L and x ∈ L0, then we can extend the above argument to a setwise
cost functions, measuring the difﬁculty of a transition from recurrent class L to
recurrent class L0. Let ω ∈ L,ω0 ∈ L0. There is a zero-cost path connecting
y with ω, and a zero-cost path connecting x with ω0. Hence, the least cost of
moving from L to L0 is exactly (2.14). This in turn shows that the least cost of
reaching a state ω ∈ L coincides with the minimal cost needed to reach the limit
set L from all other limit sets, justfying eq. (2.15). Hence, if ω is stochastically




{L|(∃ω ∈ L) : γ(ω) = min
ω0∈Ω
γ(ω0)}. (B.9)
One can also use the argument in Lemma B.6 to establish a connection with the
radius/co-radius formulas of Ellison (2000). I refer to Beggs (2005) for further
discussion.
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